Gazans Need Trump’s Solutions, Not France’s Statehood Theatrics

France hopes that by recognizing a Palestinian state the plight of the Gazan people will evaporate. It will in fact get worse, and that is because this act of diplomatic virtue signaling will be a reward to the culprit for their suffering: Hamas.

Hamas not only prolongs the war by continuing to keep all the hostages but puts civilians in harm’s way by hiding behind them and stealing the aid intended for them. The United Nations recently found that over 1,700 out of 2,000 aid trucks entering Gaza were looted by Hamas and other terrorist groups.

Declaring statehood while Gazans’ food is being stolen will serve as a validation of Hamas’s barbarism while distracting attention from the needs of the Gazan civilians.

The people of Gaza have a new partner in the U.S.-led Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), which, along with Israel, directly distributes medicine and food to Gazan civilians who need it. Launched in late May, the effort reports that in the three months since its founding it has delivered over 118 million meals to Gazans in need, and sometimes 2 million meals a day. 

That is news that has not made it into national headlines.

The GHF was established on the heels of President Trump’s repeated calls for increasing efforts to help the Gazan people, including with his February 4 announcement of his vision of hope and prosperity for Gaza, and his more recent announcement of efforts to funnel more assistance to the Gazan people. This includes a commitment by the U.S. of $60 million towards these efforts and the opening of new distribution centers in partnership with Israel.

The President’s focus is exactly righty. Sending assistance while laying the foundations in the region for a coalition to come together on behalf of the Gazan people is the only way to build a better future for this troubled part of the region.

Gaza is unique. It’s not a country. It’s had no governance for two decades. A parasite—Hamas—has taken resources intended for civilians and international organizations—particularly the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA)—have operated in the area under exploitation by the terrorist group. Perhaps where the greatest hope lies, unlike Iran’s other regional footholds, Gaza is located at great distance from its patrons.

These circumstances have direct implications for how to approach Gaza’s present situation and future.

The most important step is border security; there is a need for some Israeli military presence—particularly at the Rafah crossing at the Egypt-Gaza border. The key lesson of Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack was that Israel cannot afford to rely on technology alone. A human element is required to understand and respond to the range of tactics and tools terrorists will try to pursue towards their aim of Israel’s annihilation.

But Israel’s military presence—and success in dismantling Hamas—also appears to correlate with a decline in the terrorist group’s popularity, however modest. Recent polling of Gaza and West Bank residents shows 50% (59% in the West Bank and 38% in Gaza) support Hamas’s decision to launch the October 7 attack, down from 71% roughly one year ago. It is notable too that public demonstrations in Gaza began just two months ago as the Trump administration voiced its support for Israel’s military operations there.

A second step is to avoid the issue of governance. Gaza’s political future—along with the structures of governance—should be a priority issue of the Abraham Accords, after Israel has eliminated Hamas and rescued its hostages. Those discussions cannot, and should not, take place while Hamas is there.

The absence of any government for over two decades cannot merely be addressed by installing one, no matter how much local credibility that leadership has. And no local or regional partner appears interested in shouldering the responsibility of governing Gazans. Giving power to the Palestinian Authority (PA) as the Egyptian plan calls for is the easiest answer but has its own issues—not least because the PA, which governs in the West Bank, has its record of rewarding terrorist activity. Moreover, the PA is the least popular existing Palestinian political entity among Gazans, and its leader Mahmoud Abbas enjoys a pitiful 19% popularity among Gazans (and even less in the West Bank).

A U.S.-led transition effort in Gaza could be designed as a two-step process, the first humanitarian, the second humanistic. The most urgent attention should be given to providing basic care and security to Gazans. Once this has been established, the U.S. can follow with step two, giving the people what they need to thrive, not just survive.

The United States would have a very modest direct role in this, limited to coordination. The objective should be to divide functions among different regional partners and provide them with the political cover they need to proceed.

Earlier this year, Jordan announced plans to accept thousands of ill Gazan children. They should be encouraged to follow through on this promise and take on more responsibility addressing the stabilization of Gaza and the care of its people.

Building on its strong military and intelligence coordination with Israel in the West Bank, Jordan should be encouraged to help replicate such coordination in Gaza. It should do so with a view towards bringing other partners—particularly neighboring Egypt—to join. Jordan’s involvement is particularly important given its direct experience dealing with Hamas and other Islamist groups.

And as a final component, the United States, with Israel and other regional partners, should identify and vet a limited group of strong commercial entities to provide and distribute basic humanitarian services, with the funding provided by Gulf neighbors.

After these steps have been implemented, the humanistic phase can commence. Learning from the example of Iraq—where the U.S. spent vast amounts of resources in a failed effort to transform the country into a Jeffersonian democracy—this is a role for our partners and not for the United States. 

Our government should not be in the business of appointing religious, cultural or educational figures.

But we can shape the circumstances in which they emerge. Indeed, the United States is already doing so, with the strong approach towards Iran and the expansion of the Abraham Accords. Those agreements encouraged Israel’s integration into the region, which has not only included deepening of cultural and commercial ties with our partners but also the strong military coordination that, among other successes, included the regional air defense coordination against Iran’s direct attacks.

The Abraham Accords are the natural forum to discuss Gaza’s longer-term future and the political leadership and governance structures that could shepherd a post-Hamas Gaza into a new chapter of prosperity and peace, both for its people and for its neighbors.