Putin Near America’s Shores: A Look at Russia’s Shadow Fleet

Overview

On January 7th, 2026, the U.S. Coast Guard, with British support, seized a Russian-flagged vessel in the North Atlantic, bringing attention to Russia’s growing “Shadow Fleet”—a global naval operation to evade U.S. sanctions and maintain the flow of Russian oil and revenue. Unlike other vessels, no crude oil was found on board. Moreover, the circumstances surrounding the seizure—Russian military assets en route to protect the vessel and the raising of the Russian flag—call into question the methods used by a sanctioned fleet and the complicity of the Russian government.

The Russian Federation has been engaged in the illicit trade of sanctioned goods that directly threaten U.S. interests and embolden our adversaries. The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War has forced the international community to sanction the Russian government to limit revenue streams that fund its growing war industry. The sanctions limit Russia’s export outlets by cutting off crucial financial and transportation lifelines. Determined to continue the “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine and to export sanctioned oil, the Russians established and expanded the “Shadow Fleet.” While the Shadow Fleet appears decentralized on the surface, the reality is that the Russian government, through state-owned company Sovcomflot and the Central Bank of Russia, is deeply involved in the trade of sanctioned oil.

The core interests of the United States are the establishment of peace and security, no matter which nation it is engaging, and the United States will use the means, both economic and military, at its disposal to ensure that those priorities are met. The Shadow Fleet, being the embodiment of Russia’s defiance of American interests in global peace and security, is a tactic used by our major adversaries to evade international accountability and, therefore, should be addressed as part of comprehensive efforts to eliminate threats to the American people.

Structure of Russia’s Shadow Fleet

The Shadow Fleet is an assortment of naval vessels administered by the Russian government to export traded goods and evade sanctions. The Russian government itself does not directly operate or own the vessels per the sanctions. However, the Russian government benefits from the sale of sanctioned oil through the operations of state-owned companies, foreign companies, and stateless entities aligned with its interests.

The central operator and administrator of the Shadow Fleet is the state-owned company Sovcomflot. Prior to the Russo-Ukrainian War, Sovcomflot, with the support of the Ministry of Transportation, operated 122 vessels, including 50 crude oil tankers and 34 oil product tankers. Sovcomflot claimed it would sell ageing vessels, considering sanctions and insurance restrictions imposed on Russian commercial shipping. The buyers of the vessels are unknown, but the activities of inadequately insured vessels with questionable business practices have increased.

Whether it is transferring oil from one tanker to another, changing country registration mid-voyage, flying flags of convenience, turning off transponders, spoofing locations and International Maritime Organization (IMO) numbers, or diluting the Russian oil with another to mask the origins, these practices warrant the attention of the international community as unsafe and illicit practices that solely advance the interests of the Russian government and its partners.

The daily operators of the Shadow Fleet are shell companies originating inside or outside Russia that act on its behalf and benefit from it. The shell companies, such as Hennesea Holdings Limited, Streymoy Shipping Limited, PAO Novoship, SKF Arktika, SCF MGMT FZCO, Deliver Marine Limited, Louis Marine Shipholding, and Sunne Co Limited, are either fully owned by the Sovcomflot group or coordinated and act in Russia’s interests. Sanctions are imposed on these companies for violating American sanctions by advancing the destructive agenda of the Russian government abroad by buying, selling, and transporting their oil to adversaries, thereby encouraging their escalatory behavior.

Despite the suspicious business practices involved in transporting these seaborne-sanctioned goods into port, Sovcomflot and the shell companies must still be insured in accordance with IMO regulations. The sanctions have cut off Russia and its companies from Western financial systems and—more importantly for shipping companies—from credible Western-backed maritime insurance. Given the need to export oil with insurance, Russia has developed a parallel insurance system to maintain revenue flows. Russian insurers such as AlfaStrakhovanie, Sogaz, and Ingosstrakh, which are largely backed by the Russian National Reinsurance Company (financed and supported by the Central Bank of Russia), stepped in to fill the need. It is important to note that at the time of the imposition of sanctions, the Russian National Reinsurance Company, along with the support of former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, announced that the reinsurance company would cover Sovcomflot’s fleet—linking the resources and intent of the Russian government to the activities of the Shadow Fleet.[1]

These Russian entities, naturally separated from Western financial groups, often insure more vessels than they can reasonably handle. The lack of credit and funding means insurers cannot cover oil spills and other accidents that may occur in the open ocean, thereby creating an environmental hazard. Foreign ports across the globe now face a decision: either reject the non-Western insurers or take the risk with the new Russian insurers. Not to mention, these port authorities face a higher risk of accepting this insurance, as the vessels themselves are aged and more prone to accidents, which could jeopardize the port and the environment.

Origins of Russia’s Shadow Fleet

Sanctions on Russia were first implemented in 2014 during the Ukraine Crisis and the Russian seizure of Crimea. However, the Russians were undeterred and continued pursuing their ambitions, fortifying their efforts through initiatives such as “Fortress Russia,” which have been underway ever since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. The 2014 Russian sanctions did not exclude Russians from the Western economic system, but rather pressured Russian assets, companies, and officials to change their policy on territorial expansion. The sanctions made it more difficult for Russians to use Western capital for investment projects and to access their assets in Western systems—assets that became critical for the Russian war economy in the opening days of the Russo-Ukrainian War.

After the first couple of rounds of sanctions in 2014, President Vladimir Putin sought to make the Russian economy “sanction-proof” by intensifying manufacturing, increasing resource extraction, and expanding trade. This included moves such as agricultural autarky and expanding Russian market opportunities and trade routes. In other words, the essence of the Russian economy was to create a parallel system to the Western economic order. Included in these measures was the creation of a flotilla of vessels, supported by the Ministry of Transportation, to maintain Russia’s trade and commercial activities in the event of increased sanctions or outright exclusion from Western markets and financial centers. Under any circumstances, the Russian economy must maintain oil exports. If oil flow ceases, revenue flow suffers. As of 2024, despite fluctuations in global oil prices and operating under sanctions, oil revenue accounts on average for 20% of Russia's gross domestic product. President Putin has a vested interest in expanding, maintaining, and protecting the Shadow Fleet, as it sustains a significant portion of the war economy.

It is important to note that no official international institution, such as the United Nations (UN), has sanctioned the Russian government, officials, corporations, or individuals. Currently, those Russian entities are sanctioned by the G7 and by a coalition of nations including Australia, South Korea, Switzerland, and New Zealand. Each nation agrees to implement sanctions in accordance with its legal codes. The President of the United States, under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the National Emergencies Act (NEA), has the authority to regulate international commerce when a national emergency is declared, where the national and economic security of the United States is under threat.

The United States—in coordination with the G7,[2] coalition nations, and the authorities outlined in IEEPA, NEA, and Executive Order (EO) 14024—apply sanctions on Russian-traded goods, financial support, and services in light of the Russian government’s intent to undermine the interests of the United States. Section 2(a) of the EO effectively cuts off the Russian government and its officials from using Western financial services, including maritime insurance, which is required for all oil tankers under the IMO. Additionally, the coalition of nations agreed in December 2022 to an oil price cap of $60, further reducing the revenue flowing into the Russian war economy. With the sanctions separating the Russians from their Western insurers and their vessels vulnerable, the Shadow Fleet became a necessity.

The Global Effect of Russia’s Shadow Fleet

The continued escalation of the use of sanctioned vessels and the combat in the Russo-Ukrainian War puts the interests of the Russian government at odds with the interests of the United States. President Trump has iterated multiple times that the war in Ukraine must come to an end and peace must be established between Russia and Ukraine. Sanctioned vessels that Russia administers from afar fuel the war industry that it uses to achieve its end of subjugating Ukraine and defying American interests.

Russia operating sanctioned vessels not only in Europe, but in the Western Hemisphere, is a direct front to American interests. Russia was operating with the assistance of Venezuela, one of the world's largest oil producers. However, this important trading ally and resource is now under the control of the United States after President Trump’s very successful strike on Caracas, depriving the Russians and their partners of reliable ports and resources for their own interests.

Another Russian ally in the region, Cuba, has also benefited from Russia's illegal activities. In early 2025, Cuba imported 100,000 tons of sanctioned crude oil. More recently, in response to President Trump’s decisive actions, Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez visited Moscow in February 2026 with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov. During that meeting, Lavrov stated that the U.S. needs to demonstrate “common sense” and condemned the naval blockade of Cuba, arguing that this would leave Russia with fewer free shipping lanes to support and benefit from its allies abroad as the U.S. clamps down on maritime abuse.

Beyond the Western hemisphere, the Russian Shadow Fleet transports goods to its Chinese and Iranian counterparts, who also have a stake in opposing U.S. interests globally. The Chinese have received sanctioned Russian oil through the Russian Shadow Fleet. A “ship-to-ship” oil transfer between a Russian Shadow Fleet vessel and a Chinese vessel occurred off the coast of Malaysia in October 2025. This practice is not illegal; however, it is suspicious behavior and is most often seen among vessels that regularly evade sanctions. Similarly, the Iranians regularly perform “ship-to-ship” transfer of sanctioned oil with the Russians; however, the Iranians have the added bonus of overlapping fleet operations with the Russians. Vessels such as the Themis operate for both the Russian and Iranian shadow fleets. Overlapping operations blur the line of liability for these nations, while also further integrating and advancing their shared interests.

Furthermore, Russian interests in Arctic operations give the Russian Shadow Fleet uncontested command of maritime routes in the Northern Sea Route. The Russian Arctic serves as a base for global operations and a safe haven for Russian Shadow Fleet vessels. Over half of the vessels travelling through the Northern Sea Route were over 15 years old, and over one-third of all vessels passing through are sanctioned. The vessels also do not have “ice-classification,” which certifies them as environmentally and physically fit to navigate Arctic conditions. These vessels, whether they survive the Arctic ordeal or not, serve as simple pawns in a wider maritime chess game in which Russia and its allies seek to advance their own interests and oppose the U.S.

In continued pursuit of asserting American protection over the Western hemisphere and countering malign actors within it, the United States has seized sanctioned vessels that benefit the Russian government, its partners, and anti-American interests. Vessels such as the Marinera[3], M Sophia[4], and Olina[5] were transporting sanctioned products for the benefit of the Russian government and were appropriately seized under EO 14024 and thereafter supported EOs. These vessels were owned and operated by sanctioned companies, Louis Marine Shipholding and Sunne Co Limited. These vessels are only a small fraction of the hundreds that roam the oceans illicitly carrying sanctioned oil. President Trump’s bold action to seize sanctioned assets is laudable, as it directly confronts Russian interests and constrains their revenue. Actions like these leverage and project America’s strength while advancing American interests in establishing peace worldwide.

[1] Dmitry Medvedev is the current Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia.

[2] The G7 is composed of seven member states, which are the largest global Western economies, including Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The European Union is not an official member state, but observes as three of its member states are in the G7.

[3] The Marinera was formerly the Bella 1, but changed its name and registered as a Russian vessel flying the Russian flag at the time of seizure.

[4] The M Sophia was formerly the DHT Condor, but changed its name and registered as a Panamanian vessel, flying its flag, at the time of seizure. However, the Panamanian authorities rejected its registration, rendering the vessel “stateless.”

[5] The Olina was formerly the Minerva M, but changed its name and registered as flying the East Timor flag at the time of seizure.