Introduction

Cuba remains the Western Hemisphere’s longest-standing authoritarian regime and a major strategic concern for the United States. More than six decades after the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the island continues to operate under a centralized, one-party political system in which the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) is constitutionally designated as the “superior driving force of society and the State.” (Constitución de la República de Cuba 2019, Art. 5). The regime doesn’t allow political competition and maintains strict control over both politics and the economy. Independent political organization is prohibited, press freedom is extremely limited, dissent is criminalized, and civil society operates under heavy government surveillance (Human Rights Watch, 2024).

The regime, which is now led by a post-Castro generation, is more fragile today than at any point since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Cuba is in the midst of a severe economic and social crisis, and recent developments, as well as pressure from the Trump Administration, continue to intensify the already present uncertainty about the regime’s future. A major turning point came after the capture of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro, Cuba’s closest regional ally, by U.S. forces on January 3, 2026 (U.S. Department of War, 2026), which resulted in the loss of Venezuelan oil and ended one of Cuba's most important lifelines. At roughly the same time, the Trump Administration established a process to impose tariffs on goods from countries that supply oil to Cuba (The White House, 2026). Mexico, which had become Cuba’s main external supplier as the Venezuelan supply dropped, subsequently cut back shipments, thereby further tightening fuel availability and causing even more rolling blackouts and service disruptions across the island.

Since January, the situation on the island has continued to deteriorate. Miguel Díaz-Canel remains president, but his government has struggled to respond to Cuba's deepening crisis. With its economy collapsing, frequent blackouts, food shortages, and millions leaving the country, Cuba is entering a new and uncertain chapter (Acosta Rodríguez, 2026; Ewing-Chow, 2026). At the same time, the government has shown little willingness to loosen its political control, relying instead on the Communist Party, the security services, and the military to maintain stability. The regime has also turned increasingly toward Russia, China, Iran, and other anti-American governments for support, but those partnerships have failed to reverse Cuba's economic collapse or improve conditions for people on the island. These relationships have only pushed Cuba deeper into crisis and raised new concerns in Washington about what the island's instability could mean for the United States.

Americans must always pay close attention to developments in Cuba. The island is only 90 miles from the state of Florida at a critical crossroads in the Caribbean, making it well positioned to monitor and influence both maritime traffic and air activity near the American homeland. Its stability—or lack thereof—has direct implications for U.S. national security, border security, migration flows, drug trafficking, energy markets, and the broader security and stability of the Western Hemisphere. Beyond these challenges, the Cuban regime has long tried to undermine American interests through espionage, influence operations, and cooperation with hostile foreign governments, making developments on the island a matter of strategic concern for the United States. As Washington considers how best to reassert leadership in the hemisphere and counter the expanding influence of external adversaries, it is essential to understand not only the current condition of the Cuban regime, but also its likely future trajectory.

The Trump Administration has made restoring American primacy in the Western Hemisphere a national security objective, and that requires more than merely reacting to crises as they emerge. It requires confronting the hostile foreign actors that continue to challenge American influence and security throughout the hemisphere, with Cuba remaining among the most significant. Under what has increasingly become known as the Trump Corollary or the “Donroe Doctrine,” the United States has made clear that it will no longer tolerate hostile foreign powers establishing military, intelligence, or economic footholds anywhere in the Americas. The U.S. National Security Strategy under President Trump returns America to its traditional understanding of the Western Hemisphere as a vital zone of strategic interest and emphasizes a commitment to reducing migration pressures, strengthening regional security, and countering hostile external influence near U.S. borders (The White House, 2025).

Cuba sits at the center of that challenge. Cuba today is not the Cuba of 1991 or even the Cuba of 2014. The post-Castro transition has failed to produce political liberalization, while economic deterioration, demographic decline, rising discontent, and growing social pressures continue to erode the regime's foundations. At the same time, Havana has expanded its political, economic, intelligence, and military cooperation with countries such as Russia, China, and Iran. These relationships give America's adversaries a greater presence in the Caribbean and create opportunities for them to expand intelligence collection, military cooperation, cyber operations, and political influence just 90 miles from the U.S. homeland. As a result, Cuba has become a platform through which hostile powers project influence into the Western Hemisphere.

The Trump Administration is aware of this challenge. In a report released by the U.S. Department of State in July 2026 titled Cuba: The Capital of 21st Century Communism, the Administration documented Cuba's long history of espionage against the United States and concluded that Cuba remains a massive national security threat to the United States through its intelligence activities, support for hostile actors, ideological influence operations, and partnerships with America’s adversaries. The report reflects the Trump Administration’s view that Cuba should be treated not simply as an authoritarian state but as an active strategic challenge in the Western Hemisphere (U.S. Department of State, 2026).

This foundational paper assesses the current state of the Cuban regime and the challenges it presents to U.S. interests. A realistic and clear-eyed assessment of Cuba’s internal condition and external partnerships is essential for informed policymaking. This report seeks to provide that analysis by examining the regime’s current vulnerabilities, the pressures it currently faces, and the potential implications for U.S. interests in the years ahead. It examines the structure of political power under current President Miguel Díaz-Canel and the enduring influence of the Castro-era elite, analyzes the country’s worsening economic crisis and continuous outflow of migrants, and evaluates the regime’s internal security apparatus and methods of social and political control. It also looks at Cuba's key foreign relationships, including its partnerships with Venezuela, Mexico, Russia, China, Iran, and other global actors whose interests are hostile to those of the United States. Together, these factors provide insight into the resilience of the Cuban regime, the sources of its vulnerability, and the potential implications of this instability only 90 miles from U.S. shores.

Historical Context and Regime Evolution

Cuba's modern political system was built after the 1959 Cuban Revolution, which brought Fidel Castro and his revolutionary movement to power. In the years that followed, the new government dismantled Cuba’s democratic institutions, consolidated political authority, and established a one-party state under the PCC. (Ancient War History, 2026). Over time, political power and leadership succession became concentrated within a small circle of revolutionary leaders, military officials, and Communist Party elites. Opposition parties were banned, independent media outlets were shut down or forced under state control, and political activity outside state-approved organizations became restricted. The Cuban state made this possible in the long run by developing an extensive internal security apparatus designed to monitor dissent, restrict independent political activity, and preserve regime stability. The institutions that govern Cuba today reflect that legacy.

The result is a political system that has shown remarkable continuity despite changes in leadership. While power has passed from Fidel Castro to Raúl Castro and now to President Miguel Díaz-Canel, the basic structure of the political system has remained largely intact and unchanged. The Communist Party continues to hold a constitutionally protected leadership role, while meaningful political competition remains absent (Constitución de la República de Cuba 2019, Art. 5). The eventual transition of power once Díaz-Canel became president did not fundamentally change the existing structure but has instead continued to preserve the same system under new leadership. In that sense, the post-Castro era has not represented a political transition in any meaningful sense but has been more of a managed succession and the continuation of a system designed to prevent change that has maintained the core features of the revolutionary state.

This trajectory and its consequences help explain the challenges the island faces today. Cuba is not just facing an economic recession or a temporary challenge; it is facing the long-term effects of 67 years of actions being taken to weaken the state’s capacity to govern while leaving little room for change.

Cuba’s Political System

Cuba operates under a one-party political system in which the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) is constitutionally designated as the “superior driving force of society and the State” (Constitución de la República de Cuba 2019, Art. 5). No other political parties are allowed to operate legally, and political opposition remains heavily restricted. Government critics, dissidents, and activists face harassment, detention, and imprisonment, and the so-called actos de repudio (“acts of repudiation) continue to be used to intimidate and silence opposition voices (Freedom House, 2025).

Elections still exist and are held regularly in Cuba, but they do not provide a mechanism for meaningful political competition or leadership turnover. Candidates for the National Assembly are selected through a system controlled by organizations that operate under the guidance of the PCC. As previously mentioned, opposition parties are not allowed to field candidates, so voters are generally presented with a single candidate for each seat. As a result, elections function more as a ratification process than an actual contest between political candidates. Although local municipal elections may include multiple candidates on the ballot, campaigning is not allowed, and the broader electoral framework remains under the control of state institutions aligned with the PCC. Political power therefore remains concentrated within a relatively small group of party, government, and security officials, with limited space for independent political participation or change in leadership.

The March 2023 National Assembly elections are a good example of this structure. All 470 approved candidates were elected. Then, the newly seated National Assembly subsequently reelected Miguel Díaz-Canel as president and reappointed senior government officials to their existing positions. Following the vote, Alina Balseiro, president of Cuba's National Electoral Council, thanked the Cuban people for participating “in a massive way in this electoral process of transcendental importance for the present and the future of the nation.” President Miguel Díaz-Canel also described the outcome as a victory for Cuba, calling the results “a clean home run” (Sherwood, 2023).

President Miguel Díaz-Canel continues to serve as Cuba’s formal head of state and government, but the Communist Party and the Revolutionary Armed Forces remain the central pillars of the political system. Power and decision-making are shared among a network of senior party officials, military leadership, security services, and figures tied to the Castro era. The armed forces also maintain major influence over sectors of the economy through the military-owned conglomerate GAESA, formally known as the Business Administration Group, S.A. or “Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A.” Originally created under Raúl Castro to support Cuba's defense sector, GAESA now controls major portions of the tourism, retail, finance, transportation, logistics, and foreign trade sectors, making it one of the most powerful institutions on the island. Estimates from economists and outside observers suggest they control between 40-70% of the island's entire economy, giving military-linked institutions extraordinary control over how the country is run and where its money goes (Abi-Habib & Gamio, 2026). GAESA has never operated like a typical state-owned company. Leadership positions have long been filled by senior military officers and people in or close to the Castro family, ensuring that control over Cuba's largest businesses remains in the hands of the same small group that runs the country's political system. For years, it was led by Gen. Luis Alberto Rodríguez López-Calleja, Raúl Castro's former son-in-law and one of the most influential figures in the regime (EFE/Telemundo 51, 2022). GAESA has remained closely connected to the leadership networks in the post-Castro era.

These tight political and economic controls have made it nearly impossible for opposition political movements to emerge. Political activity outside state-approved institutions remains heavily restricted, and independent civil society organizations face constant government supervision (Freedom House, 2025). Decades of restrictions on political organization, association, and dissent have also limited the emergence of opposition figures or new political movements inside the country. As a result, the PCC continues to monopolize Cuba's political landscape, and many of Cuba's most prominent opposition figures, activists, entrepreneurs, academics, and political voices are forced to operate from outside the island, particularly from exile communities in the United States and Europe (Lachter, 2026).

Public dissatisfaction has grown along with the country's economic crisis. According to a 2025 survey, approximately 92% of respondents reported an unfavorable view of the government, while only 5% expressed a favorable opinion (Observatorio de Derechos Sociales Cuba, 2025). Yet despite this discontent, the political system still provides no avenues for independent groups to organize, compete for power, or develop viable alternatives to the existing leadership.

Economic Collapse and Structural Crisis

Cuba’s economic crisis did not happen overnight. For decades, the country's state-controlled economy has struggled with low productivity, limited private-sector activity, and heavy dependence on foreign support for food, energy, and financing. Over the years, that support has shifted from subsidies from the Soviet Union during the Cold War to Venezuelan oil after the Soviet collapse, and, more recently, to countries such as Russia, China, and other governments that are hostile to the United States. In recent years, these long-standing weaknesses have been compounded by external shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic, failed economic reforms, worsening fiscal and monetary imbalances, and the loss of foreign partners and support.

The economy contracted by 10.9% in 2020, one of the sharpest declines in Latin America, and has not recovered to pre-pandemic levels (Congressional Research Service, 2022). Efforts to stabilize the system have largely fallen short. The 2021 monetary reform, intended to eliminate Cuba's dual currency, instead contributed to inflation, shortages, and more market distortions. Official figures reported that inflation exceeded 30% in 2023, and independent economists estimated even higher increases in consumer markets (Vidal Alejandro, 2025).

The consequences of this crisis are impossible to ignore across the island. Shortages of food, fuel, medicine, and electricity are considered normal for most Cubans. Rolling blackouts have become more frequent as fuel supplies dwindle, disrupting transportation, public services, industrial production, and access to clean water. In May 2025, Cuba's energy minister acknowledged that the country had exhausted much of the diesel and fuel oil needed to keep power plants operating. In some parts of the island, residents go days without electricity, making it difficult to refrigerate food, pump water, or carry out basic household activities. One resident reported that they started using their refrigerator as a wardrobe because there was almost never any power (Acosta Rodríguez, 2026). The crisis worsened further in July 2026 when Cuba suffered its third nationwide blackout in six months and its eighth major blackout since late 2024 (The Guardian, 2026).

Household data helps illustrate the severity of this crisis. According to the Observatorio de Derechos Sociales Cuba, approximately 89% of Cuban families live in conditions of extreme poverty, with a majority reporting difficulty obtaining even basic necessities (Observatorio de Derechos Sociales Cuba, 2025). The same survey found that roughly seven in ten Cubans have reported having to skip meals because food was unavailable or unaffordable. Cuban journalists have described families surviving on a single meal per day or on whatever food they could find or catch for themselves that day and relying on firewood because fuel costs have become too expensive (Acosta Rodríguez, 2026).

Access to healthcare and medicine has also become increasingly difficult. The decline is especially striking given that Cuba once promoted its medical system and overseas medical missions as one of the country's greatest achievements (Evans, 2026). For decades, Havana dispatched tens of thousands of doctors and other healthcare workers around the world, earning billions of dollars in revenue while using what became known as “medical diplomacy” to expand its international influence. Today, however, many Cubans struggle to find a doctor, obtain basic medicines, or receive timely medical care in their own communities as hospitals face severe staffing shortages and deteriorating conditions. Now, only 3% of survey participants reported being able to consistently obtain needed medications through the state pharmacy system, and many households reported going without treatment because medicines were unavailable or too expensive (Observatorio de Derechos Sociales Cuba, 2025). Hospitals also face shortages of supplies, including basic supplies such as antibiotics, syringes, and other essential materials (Ewing-Chow, 2026), in turn forcing many families to turn to the black market or informal markets (Janetsky, 2022), or go without treatment altogether. Fuel shortages, old equipment, and a lack of resources have left ambulances unable to respond promptly to emergencies, with reports of patients dying while waiting for care that arrived too late or never arrived at all (Havana Times, 2026).

At the same time, wages and pensions have failed to keep pace with rising prices. Cuba's state minimum wage is 2,100 pesos per month (Havana Times, 2026), equal to less than $4 at current informal exchange rates, while the average pension is about $9 per month (Moreno, 2026). At those levels, for many Cubans, a month’s income is not enough to cover even a limited basket of basic food staples. In addition, the deterioration of the libreta de abastecimiento (“state rationing system”), which has provided basic food staples since the 1960s, has left many households with even less food and essential products. As a result, there has been a visible increase in poverty across the island. Elderly Cubans have been forced to search for food in garbage bins (Moreno, 2026), and begging has become an increasingly common feature of daily life across the island (Q24N, 2026).

This devastating economic reality has become increasingly difficult to hide, despite the government’s best efforts. In July 2025, Cuba's labor minister Marta Elena Feitó Cabrera sparked widespread outrage after claiming that there were no beggars in Cuba, and that those seen living on the streets or begging for money were doing so voluntarily (BBC News Mundo, 2025). The remarks came at a time when shortages, poverty, and homelessness had become increasingly visible internationally and impossible to deny. Her comments were widely criticized, and she was later removed from office, but the remarks exposed the major disconnect between official government narratives and the daily reality of many Cubans struggling with increasingly worsening living conditions, which only magnified the Cuban government’s growing credibility problem.

There is a major gap between the living conditions of ordinary Cubans and the privileges enjoyed by the ruling elite. While shortages of food, medicine, fuel, and electricity have become a part of daily life for many, military-linked institutions continue to control a large share of the country's economic resources. GAESA, (Abi-Habib & Gamio, 2026), is said to control at least 40% of the national economy (Vidal, 2025), and 95% of all foreign-currency transactions (Cuba Siglo 21, 2025) with reported assets of approximately $18 billion (Gamez Torres, 2025). Critics argue that this concentration of economic power has allowed scarce resources to remain in the hands of regime-linked institutions even as living standards continue to deteriorate for regular Cubans.

Taken together, these indicators point to more than a temporary economic recession or temporary downturn. Cuba faces a prolonged structural crisis that has reduced living standards, weakened public services, accelerated emigration, and increased social pressure across the country. The government has yet to address the underlying problems that continue to drive this decline.

Social Control and Repression

Despite Cuba's worsening conditions, the government has maintained a strong capacity to monitor and control political activity. State security agencies continue to play a central role in managing dissent, while legal and administrative restrictions limit independent political organizing, public demonstrations, and civil society activity.

As previously mentioned, the constitution identifies the PCC as the “superior driving force of society and the state” (Constitución de la República de Cuba 2019, Art. 5). All other political parties are illegal. Freedom of expression, assembly, and association are heavily restricted. Political dissent is a punishable offense, and dissidents are harassed, detained, physically assaulted, and imprisoned for minor infractions. Independent journalists, activists, religious leaders, and opposition figures regularly report and decry surveillance, short-term detentions, harassment, and restrictions on movement (Human Rights Watch, 2024). Actos de repudio (“acts of repudiation”), in which groups publicly try to intimidate and silence government critics, continue to be reported by human rights organizations (Freedom House, 2025).

The regime's ability to remain in power depends on more than just the police and intelligence services. It also relies on an extensive system of neighborhood surveillance. The Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs), established in 1960, operate in communities across the island and have long served as the eyes and ears of the government. These groups work alongside state security and the Ministry of the Interior, and they monitor neighborhoods, report suspicious activity, and help discourage political organizing before it gains strength. The result is a society where many Cubans automatically assume they are being watched. Distrust runs deep, making it difficult for opposition movements to organize even when public frustration with the government is widespread (Pérez, 2026).

Public dissatisfaction has become increasingly visible in recent years. The nationwide demonstrations of July 11, 2021, were the largest anti-government protests in Cuba in decades (Alfonseca, 2021). The government responded to these protests with mass arrests and prosecutions, and detained hundreds of individuals in connection with the protests. Many of them remain incarcerated (U.S. Department of State, 2025). Protests across the island have occurred since then, but generally on a smaller scale. In May 2026, residents in several Havana neighborhoods took to the streets following prolonged power outages and deteriorating living conditions (Sherwood, 2026). The Cuban Observatory of Conflicts recorded 1,133 protests in April alone, a nearly 30% increase over the same month the previous year (CiberCuba, 2026). These actions reflect growing frustration with economic conditions, governance failures, and the absence of political freedom.

Despite the largely peaceful nature of many demonstrations, authorities have continued to use arrests, detentions, and criminal charges against participants, and while intensifying pressure on political prisoners, independent journalists (Reporters Without Borders, 2026), opposition activists, and civil society organizations (Amnesty International, 2025). Madrid-based non-governmental organization (NGO) Prisoners Defenders currently reports that 1,281 political prisoners are being held by Cuban authorities as of June 2026 (Prisoners Defenders, n.d.).

Demographic Decline and Emigration

One of the clearest indicators of Cuba's ongoing crisis is the sheer scale of emigration. In recent years, the island has experienced one of the largest population outflows in its history as hundreds of thousands of Cubans have left in search of better economic opportunities and improved living conditions. According to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency, a record-breaking number of Cubans have arrived in the U.S. over the past couple of years. More than 425,000 Cubans were encountered at U.S. ports of entry in fiscal years 2022 and 2023 alone, including more than 200,000 in fiscal year 2023 (Bazail-Eimil, 2023).

The scale of this migration is historically significant: more Cubans came to the U.S. during fiscal years 2022 and 2023 than arrived during the Freedom Flights program, which brought approximately 270,000 Cubans to the United States over a roughly eight-year period between 1965 and 1973. This recent exodus also exceeded the combined number of Cubans who left the island during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift and the 1994 Balsero (rafter) crisis (Center for Engagement and Advocacy in the Americas, n.d.).

The consequences can be seen in how Cuba's population has shrunk so quickly in a short amount of time. Of the 11.3 million people registered before the pandemic, the most recent data from February 2026 indicates that the resident population on the island has fallen to 8 million inhabitants, a figure that represents the loss of nearly a quarter of its citizens in just four years (Aroma de Cuba, 2026). While emigration has been a driver for much of Cuba's recent population decline, other demographic pressures have also compounded this. The country faces an aging population, low birth rates, and elevated mortality. According to official data presented by the Cuban government, more than 517,000 deaths were recorded in Cuba between 2020 and 2023 (CiberCuba, 2024).

The cost of this exodus is enormous. Cuba is losing many of the very people it needs most—working-age individuals such as doctors, engineers, business owners, and other skilled professionals. Every person who leaves makes it harder for the country to rebuild its economy and support an aging population. These losses also place even more strain on public services and social support systems.

Survey data suggests that the desire to leave the country remains widespread. According to the Observatorio de Derechos Sociales Cuba, 78% of respondents either wanted to emigrate or knew someone who wanted to leave the country. The desire to emigrate was particularly strong among younger Cubans, with 76% of respondents between the ages of 18 and 30 expressing a desire to leave, compared to 61% of those between the ages of 31 and 45. While the United States remained the preferred destination for many respondents, 34% indicated they would move to any country willing to receive them, reflecting the depth of dissatisfaction and uncertainty facing many Cuban households (Observatorio de Derechos Sociales Cuba, 2025).

Cuba on the Global Stage

Cuba's foreign policy has consistently been defined by opposition to the United States. Since 1959, Havana has cultivated relationships with governments and organizations that strengthen the regime while challenging American interests and the Western-led international order. Although these partnerships are rooted in shared ideology, they are also pragmatic, and they provide Cuba with economic assistance, intelligence cooperation, military collaboration, diplomatic support, and political cover. Through its relationships with Venezuela, Russia, China, Iran, and other anti-American governments, Havana has secured the support necessary to withstand decades of international pressure while enabling hostile extra-hemispheric powers to expand their presence in the Western Hemisphere. From a U.S. national security perspective, these partnerships provide America's adversaries with opportunities to project power, collect intelligence, challenge U.S. influence, and erode regional security. The following sections examine Cuba's most significant strategic partnerships and their implications for U.S. interests.

Venezuela: Cuba's Closest Regional Ally

Cuba’s most important regional relationship has long been with Venezuela. The two governments have built a partnership rooted in shared ideology, hostility toward the United States, and centered on mutual survival. The foundations of the modern Havana-Caracas alliance were laid during the 1990s, when both countries faced significant crises. Cuba was struggling to survive the economic shock that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, while Venezuela was experiencing growing political instability and the erosion of its traditional political system (Luis León, 2019). These parallel challenges pushed both governments toward a mutually beneficial relationship centered on regime survival.

Following Hugo Chávez’s rise to power in 1999, that relationship became one of Cuba's most important strategic partnerships. Venezuela provided Cuba with subsidized oil, financial support, and economic relief at a time when the island needed outside support after the collapse of Soviet assistance, which caused an economic collapse resulting in the so-called Special Period (Luis León, 2019). In return, Cuba supplied doctors, technical personnel, intelligence advisers, and security assistance, creating a relationship that extended far beyond traditional diplomatic cooperation.

Chávez’s admiration for Cuba and Fidel Castro was evident early in his presidency. In March 2000, while receiving Cuban volunteer workers, he declared, “Cuba is the sea of happiness. That's where Venezuela is going.” Chávez frequently described Castro as a mentor and viewed the Cuban model as an example for Venezuela to follow (News.com.au, 2013).

Over the past 15 years, Venezuela and Cuba have stayed close economic allies, but the alliance also evolved into a close security partnership in which Cuban advisers played an important role in Venezuela's intelligence and internal security apparatus. Cuban intelligence personnel have helped train and support institutions responsible for monitoring political dissent, including those within the Venezuelan military, reducing the likelihood that the armed forces could emerge as a source of opposition to the Chávez and Maduro governments. In May 2008, both countries signed a security agreement that allowed Cuban intelligence personnel to establish Venezuela’s Directorate General of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM), an agency responsible for monitoring the loyalty or allegiance of military officers and investigating perceived threats to the regime (Chang, 2019).

For Cuba, Venezuelan oil provided a critical economic lifeline. For Venezuela, Cuban support helped the Chávez and Maduro governments strengthen internal control. This arrangement has been described as an “oil for repression” model, arguing that Venezuela exchanged oil for Cuban-designed systems of intelligence, surveillance, and political control. Estimates suggest that Venezuela transferred the equivalent of more than $63 billion to Cuba since 2000, while Cuban security networks became deeply embedded within Venezuela’s military, police, and intelligence institutions (Miranda Center for Democracy, 2026).

From a U.S. perspective, this relationship matters because it links two hostile regimes less than 100 miles from Florida to a broader anti-American network in the Western Hemisphere. For more than two decades now, Havana and Caracas have cooperated with one another to resist U.S. pressure, support each another politically and economically, and do whatever it takes to help keep each other's regimes in power. The partnership also provided Cuba with access to energy and money while giving Venezuelan leaders relied on Cuban intelligence and security advisers to strengthen the vicious Maduro regime.

Recent developments have made this relationship more important to watch. The capture of Nicolás Maduro by U.S. forces in January 2026 created an inflection point for Cuba because Venezuelan support had long been one of Havana’s most important lifelines. In addition to that, it was long known that Maduro's ties to Cuba were unusually deep. As a young man, he spent a year in Cuba receiving ideological instruction. Over the following decades, he developed close personal, political, and institutional ties with Havana and became one of Cuba's most reliable partners within the Venezuelan government (Norman-Diamond, 2026).

The events surrounding Maduro's capture also revealed the extent of Cuba's involvement in Venezuela. Thirty-two Cuban agents were killed during the operation, highlighting the degree to which Cuban personnel had become embedded within Venezuela's security apparatus (Rodríguez, 2026). The operation also effectively cut off the flow of Venezuelan oil to Cuba, depriving Havana of one of its most important sources of foreign support. The disruption of that arrangement represents one of the most significant strategic setbacks Cuba has faced since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Mexico: Balancing Relations with Havana and Washington

Mexico occupies a unique place in Cuba's foreign relations. Unlike most countries in the Western Hemisphere, Mexico never severed diplomatic relations with Havana after the Cuban Revolution. Mexico's distinctive approach to Cuba dates back to the revolution itself. Fidel Castro, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, and other revolutionaries organized and planned much of their movement while living in Mexico City prior to the 1959 revolution. Mexico’s role in Cuba's revolutionary history remained commemorated in Mexico City for decades through a monument depicting Castro and Guevara, which was there until 2025 (McDonnell, 2025).

Following Castro's rise to power, Mexico maintained warm relations with Havana even as the United States and many other countries in the hemisphere moved to isolate the regime. In 1961, the Mexican government led efforts at the United Nations to condemn and protest the U.S.-backed Bay of Pigs invasion, signaling its opposition to direct intervention against Cuba. The following year, during the most dangerous confrontation of the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, Mexican President Adolfo López Mateos refused American President John F. Kennedy's request for Mexican participation in the naval blockade of Cuba, despite the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles on the island. Mexico also refused to support the growing campaign to isolate Havana within the Organization of American States (OAS), despite strong pressure from the United States. These events led President Kennedy to postpone an official state visit to Mexico, and there were even rumors that American foreign aid to Mexico would be cut off. Despite this, Mexico continued this approach throughout the 1960s, repeatedly opposing regional sanctions against Cuba and, in 1964, Mexico became the only OAS member to reject the U.S.-led effort to sever diplomatic relations with the Castro regime (Familiar-Avalos, 2018).

Despite the generally close relationship between Cuba and Mexico, tensions periodically emerged. Recently declassified CIA documents indicate that successive Mexican governments quietly cooperated with U.S. intelligence efforts to monitor Cuban and Soviet diplomatic activities from the late 1950s through the 1990s (Dorfman, 2024).

Relations experienced a more visible rupture during the presidency of Vicente Fox. In February 2002, Vicente Fox traveled to Cuba on an official visit, and, at the last minute, unexpectedly met with dissidents and opposition figures, including Oswaldo Payá, a move that angered the Castro government (Núñez & Marcial Pérez, 2026). Tensions escalated even further several weeks later during the infamous comes y te vas (“eat and leave”) controversy. Ahead of a regional summit in Monterrey, Fox privately asked Fidel Castro to attend the event, participate in the official luncheon, and depart before the arrival of U.S. President George W. Bush. Castro publicly released a recording of the conversation, as evidence that Fox was acting on behalf of the United States rather than pursuing Mexico's traditionally independent policy toward Cuba in decades (CNN Español, 2016). This triggered one of the worst diplomatic disputes between Havana and Mexico. During the rest of Fox’s presidency, Mexico moved closer to the U.S. position on Cuba than at any point in decades. Between 2002 and 2005, Mexico supported a series of U.N. Human Rights Commission resolutions criticizing the Castro regime. The most significant came in 2004, when Mexico cast the decisive vote for a resolution condemning Cuba’s imprisonment of political dissidents and forcing Havana to accept scrutiny from a U.N. human rights rapporteur (Núñez & Marcial Pérez, 2026). This period marked a low point in modern Cuba-Mexico relations.

Under President Felipe Calderón, Mexico gradually restored relations with Cuba. Calderón participated in the first summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in Venezuela in 2011 and signed the Caracas Declaration, which condemned the 50-year-long U.S. trade embargo against Cuba (Franks, 2012). This approach continued under President Enrique Peña Nieto, whose administration completed the normalization of bilateral relations. Peña Nieto traveled to Cuba in January 2014 not only to participate in the CELAC summit but also to meet both Raúl and Fidel Castro. The trend continued in 2015 when Raúl Castro paid an official visit to Mexico, where both governments emphasized the “historic brotherhood” between the two countries (Martínez Ahrens, 2015). By November 2016, just weeks after Donald Trump was elected president of the United States, Peña Nieto attended Fidel Castro's funeral in Havana (Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 2016).

Under President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), Mexico's relationship with Cuba grew even closer. His administration expanded political cooperation with Havana, provided humanitarian assistance, and became an increasingly important economic partner for the island at a time when Cuba was facing renewed international pressure. In June 2022, López Obrador publicly condemned the Biden Administration's decision to exclude Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua from the Summit of the Americas, ultimately refusing to attend the summit himself in protest (Sesin, 2022). AMLO strengthened ties even more through an official visit to Cuba, where he criticized the U.S. embargo, expanded bilateral cooperation, and reached agreements to hire Cuban medical personnel in Mexico (El Comercio, 2022).

Cuba’s overseas medical missions have become one of the most controversial aspects of the Cuba-Mexico relationship. Critics contend that these programs function as instruments of political influence and regime financing instead of humanitarian initiatives. Exiled Cuban physician Antonio Guedes has argued that the missions serve as mechanisms for labor exploitation, propaganda, and intelligence collection while generating revenue for the Cuban government (CiberCuba, 2025). Mexican Senator Julen Rementería del Puerto similarly described the hiring of Cuban doctors as a scheme to channel money to the Cuban regime, and alleged that the practice of deploying of Cuban doctors abroad is just a way to get revenue for Havana while advancing the political interests of the Cuban state (Grupo Parlamentario del PAN en el Senado, 2022).

It is estimated that Cuba has more than 26,000 doctors and nurses working in 55 countries, a practice that generates billions each year for the Cuban regime since participating professionals receive only 10-15% of the revenue generated while the Cuban government retains the vast majority of the proceeds (Gamez Torres, 2025). Estimates suggest the program generates between $8 billion and $10 billion annually, making the export of medical services one of Cuban regime’s largest sources of revenue, even surpassing tourism (Schamis, 2024).

Current President Claudia Sheinbaum has largely continued her predecessor AMLO’s approach toward Cuba, working to maintain Mexico's longstanding relationship with Havana despite increasing pressure from Washington and the international community. That relationship faced new challenges in January 2026, when President Donald Trump announced measures targeting countries that continued supplying oil to Cuba (Planas, 2026), a move that directly affected Mexico, which had become the island's most important energy partner following the decline of Venezuelan support. Although Mexico subsequently stopped oil shipments to Cuba, Sheinbaum insisted that the decision was sovereign and not the result of U.S. pressure (Graham, 2026).

The Trump Administration also expanded its efforts to isolate the Cuban regime through additional sanctions and visa restrictions targeting countries and individuals involved in Cuba's overseas labor-export programs, including its medical missions (U.S. Department of State, 2025). Sheinbaum has openly criticized these measures, arguing that Mexico has the right to provide fuel to Cuba for either humanitarian or commercial purposes. She has described Trump's efforts to economically isolate the island as “unjust” and accused the United States of “suffocating” Cubans through sanctions (Janetsky & Weissert, 2026). Her administration has continued to provide humanitarian assistance to Cuba, including shipments of food and other aid, and Sheinbaum has even donated her own money to the cause. She has also reaffirmed Mexico's commitment to employing Cuban medical personnel despite growing U.S. pressure and the decision by several other countries in the region to terminate similar programs (Reuters, 2026).

This situation highlights one of the longest-running disagreements between Washington and Mexico City. While the United States increasingly views economic pressure and diplomatic isolation as necessary tools for confronting the Cuban regime, most Mexican governments have generally favored engagement, economic assistance, and political cooperation. As a result, Cuba has remained a recurring source of tension in the broader U.S.-Mexico relationship.

Russia: From Soviet Patron to Strategic Partner

Russia is another of Cuba's most important extra-hemispheric partners. Although the collapse of the Soviet Union deprived Havana of its principal economic benefactor, ties between the two countries never disappeared and have steadily gotten stronger under Vladimir Putin. In the past couple of years, Russia has provided Cuba with economic assistance, debt relief, infrastructure investment, energy cooperation, diplomatic support, and political protection, while Cuba gives it intelligence access and a foothold in the Caribbean in return (Brams, 2026). From a U.S. perspective, the relationship is especially concerning, given that Cuba is less than 90 miles from the state of Florida. U.S. officials have warned that Cuba is increasingly serving as a platform for Russian and Chinese intelligence collection in the Western Hemisphere (Ward & Bergengruen, 2026), while Havana has emerged as one of Moscow's most reliable political partners in the region during Russia's war against Ukraine (U.S. Department of State, 2026).

Russia and Cuba have a long history together. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was Cuba's main patron, providing billions of dollars in aid, weapons, oil, and political support, which helped keep the Castro regime afloat for many decades. In exchange, Cuba became one of Moscow's closest allies in the Western Hemisphere and a key platform for projecting Soviet influence in territories near the United States. The relationship reached its most dangerous peak during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when the Soviet Union placed nuclear missiles on the island and brought the world closer to nuclear war than at any other point in the Cold War.

During the Cold War, the Soviets operated the massive Lourdes signals intelligence facility outside Havana, which was one of the largest foreign espionage installations in the world. The facility was staffed by thousands of personnel and had the ability to intercept U.S. military, government, diplomatic, satellite, and commercial communications across most of North America. For decades, the Lourdes facility symbolized Moscow's ability to project intelligence capabilities into the Western Hemisphere from a location just 90 miles from the United States (Windrem, 2003).

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 dealt a devastating blow to Cuba. Overnight, the island lost the economic support it had depended on for decades, triggering the severe economic crisis known as the Special Period. Although Russian aid largely disappeared, the relationship between Havana and Moscow never did. Those political ties endured through the 1990s and later became the foundation for a renewed partnership under Vladimir Putin.

The modern Russia-Cuba relationship began to recover after Vladimir Putin came to power. Putin visited Cuba in 2000 (President of Russia, 2000), signaling his interest in rebuilding influence in the Western Hemisphere. Over the next 20 years, Russia forgave roughly $32 billion in Soviet-era Cuban debt (Ostroukh & de Córdoba, 2014), expanded trade and infrastructure cooperation, renewed military and intelligence contacts, and ultimately reestablished itself as one of Cuba’s most important external partners.

The relationship deepened even further when Miguel Díaz-Canel assumed the Cuban presidency. Russia provided loans, investment, fuel, tourism, and diplomatic support at a time when Cuba's economy was deteriorating, and Venezuelan assistance was declining. During a visit to Moscow in 2018, discussions reportedly included the possibility of a $50 million Russian loan to finance Cuban purchases of military equipment and expanded defense cooperation, while Moscow announced hundreds of millions of dollars in infrastructure investments on the island (Mikelionis, 2018). These efforts reflected a broader Russian strategy of rebuilding influence in Cuba rather than simply maintaining symbolic ties from the Cold War era. Russia’s ambitions extended beyond Cuba, and they have deepened their presence in the entire region. They also provided billions of dollars in loans for Venezuelan weapons purchases, floated the idea of opening Russian military bases in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua (DNA Web Team, 2014), and have continued openly touting their cooperation with these partners as tensions with the United States increased.

Security cooperation remains an important component of the relationship. Russian naval and intelligence vessels continue to make periodic visits to Cuban ports, including the Viktor Leonov intelligence ship, which docked in Havana just one day before the arrival of the American delegation to negotiate the normalization of relations between Cuba and the United States in January 2015 (RT, 2015). More recently, U.S. officials have expressed concern that Russia and China are expanding intelligence collection activities on the island. These developments have spurred fears that Cuba is again being used as a platform for monitoring U.S. military, government, and commercial communications (Ward & Bergengruen, 2026).

In recent years, Russia has become more important to Cuba as the island's other sources of support have weakened. Russian officials have pledged to help Cuba withstand what they described as U.S. “blackmail and threats” and have criticized American sanctions as an effort to strangle the island (Reuters, 2026; Brams, 2026). Cuban leaders have reciprocated with strong public support for Moscow. In 2022, Vladimir Putin and Miguel Díaz-Canel met in Moscow to unveil a monument to Fidel Castro, which both governments used to emphasize the enduring nature of the relationship. In the same meeting, Díaz-Canel described the relationship as “indestructible” (Robbio, 2025).

Russia's war against Ukraine has added a new dimension to the relationship. A June 2026 U.S. Department of State report found that Cuba has become one of Russia's most active partners in the Western Hemisphere and has provided political, diplomatic, and limited military support for Russia’s war effort (U.S. Department of State, 2026). Reports have estimated that thousands of Cubans have joined Russian forces in Ukraine, with estimates ranging from 5,000 to 25,000 Cuban nationals (Barrero, 2025). Concerns over the recruitment pipeline became so severe that Ukraine announced the closure of its embassy in Havana in 2025, citing Cuba's failure to address the flow of Cuban nationals joining Russian forces (Höller, 2025).

From a U.S. perspective, the Cuba-Russia relationship is extremely concerning. It links an already hostile regime near America’s shores with one of Washington's main global adversaries and shows there is a broader strategy aimed at restoring Russian influence and cultivating anti-American partners throughout the Western Hemisphere. Russia has repeatedly identified Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua as its principal partners in Latin America, and in 2021 Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu publicly described the three countries as key allies facing common external threats and pledged continued Russian support. Since then, Russia has expanded political, military, and security cooperation with all three governments, reinforcing what many analysts view as an anti-American bloc in the region (MercoPress, 2021).

China: Strategic Competition in the Western Hemisphere

China is another of Cuba’s most important extra-hemispheric partners, and both have a lot in common. Both are left-wing authoritarian regimes ruled by communist parties and view the United States as their main security threat. Like Cuba’s relationship with Russia, their relationship with China is also partly rooted in decades of ideological alignment. Unlike Russia, however, China’s interest in Cuba is not primarily driven by ideology or revolutionary solidarity or Cold War nostalgia. China's interest is much more strategic, and is driven by geography, potential intelligence value, and strategic competition with the United States. For China, Cuba offers something few other countries can: a location less than 90 miles from the United States.

Relations between Havana and Beijing have not always been close. During much of the Cold War, the Sino-Soviet split created tensions between the two governments, especially when Fidel Castro began aligning Cuba closely with the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, Cuba was on the lookout for new international partners, and China was already becoming a major economic and geopolitical power. Since the 1990s, the relationship between both countries has narrowed, and their ties across trade, infrastructure, technology, diplomacy, and security have continued to grow steadily. (MacDonald, 2024).

Although China has not invested as heavily in Cuba as it has in other Latin American countries, it has become one of Havana’s most important economic partners. China is one of Cuba's largest trading partners and a very important source of investment, financing, and technical assistance. Chinese companies have participated in infrastructure, transportation, energy, and petrochemical projects on the island, while Beijing has provided food aid, medical supplies, loans, and other forms of economic support. China also welcomed Cuba into the Belt and Road Initiative in 2018 and has consistently opposed the U.S. embargo on the island. In addition, China buys nickel and zinc from the Cubans, two minerals that are increasingly important for batteries and other technologies associated with the global energy transition. They are also known to give favorable loans and donations to Cuba. In 2022, following a meeting between Xi Jinping and Miguel Díaz-Canel, China agreed to provide debt relief and additional financing given the island was going through a period of severe economic hardship (Reuters, 2022).

Beyond trade, financing, and infrastructure projects, Chinese firms have played an important role in developing Cuba’s telecommunications infrastructure, and that includes helping the Cuban government enhance population surveillance. Companies such as Huawei, TP-Link, and ZTE have supported Cuba's technological infrastructure and even supplied the technology that the Cuban government uses to manage communications networks and monitor information flows on the island. During the nationwide protests of July 2021, the Cuban government used Chinese technology to shut down the country’s internet, hindering the population’s ability to communicate and organize (Lazarus & Ellis, 2021).

The relationship is also diplomatic. Havana and Beijing often support each other in international forums and have been known to take similar positions on issues related to sovereignty, sanctions, and appeals against interference in domestic affairs. Cuba has consistently defended China on the international stage, including in the United Nations, where they came to China’s defense by writing the joint declaration on behalf of 45 countries, backing China on sensitive issues such as Xinjiang and human rights (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2024). The diplomatic support goes both ways. In 2026, the Chinese Embassy spokesperson Liu Pengyu reaffirmed Beijing's support for Cuba's “national sovereignty and security,” criticized U.S. sanctions against Cuba, and called for their removal (Phillips, 2026).

From a U.S. perspective, the most consequential aspect of the relationship is the strategic value Cuba offers Beijing. For decades, Cuba's proximity to the United States has made it an attractive location for Chinese intelligence collection, and recent reports have raised concerns that China is expanding its presence there. U.S. officials and independent researchers have pointed to facilities in Cuba that may be capable of monitoring military, government, commercial, maritime, and aerospace communications throughout the southeastern United States and the Caribbean (Funaiole et al., 2026). In 2024, researchers at the Center for Strategic and International Studies identified several sites in Cuba that appeared capable of supporting signals intelligence collection, including facilities with possible links to China (Funaiole et al., 2025). A follow-up analysis that was published in 2026 revealed additional construction and expanded capabilities at some of these locations, including the Bejucal signals intelligence site outside Havana (Funaiole et al., 2026). U.S. officials have also warned that Chinese and Russian intelligence activities in Cuba have increased in recent years, raising concerns about surveillance of American military installations, critical infrastructure, maritime traffic, and aerospace activity throughout the Western Hemisphere (Ward & Bergengruen, 2026).

Exporting Revolution: Cuba's Global Interventions

Since the Cuban Revolution, Havana has pursued an aggressive foreign policy that has extended far beyond the island. It has not simply defended its own revolution but sought to export it. Despite its small size, the Cuban government has a history of being willing to support terrorist regimes, authoritarian governments, revolutionary movements, and armed insurgencies around the world. Few countries have projected military and ideological influence so aggressively beyond their own borders. They have regularly provided military, intelligence, financial, and logistical support to anti-American groups across Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. These efforts were often shrugged off by Havana as acts of international solidarity, but these acts all advanced Soviet strategic interests, weakened pro-American governments, and helped spread communist influence abroad. Cuba’s long history and current international activity should be seen as a threat to the U.S.

One of Cuba's largest and most consequential overseas military interventions took place in Angola. Beginning in 1975, Cuba sent tens of thousands of troops, along with tanks, artillery, aircraft, and military advisers, to support the Soviet-supported, Marxist-Leninist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) during the Angolan Civil War (Brazil, n.d.; Kapcia, 2025). At its peak, more than 50,000 Cuban military personnel were stationed in Angola. The conflict quickly evolved into a major Cold War proxy war involving Cuba, the Soviet Union, South Africa, and the United States, with Cuban forces playing a massive role in helping the MPLA secure and maintain power, contributing to the establishment of a one-party socialist state aligned with Russia. Cuban troops stayed in Angola for more than a decade after, an example of Cuba’s willingness to project military power thousands of miles from its shores in support of communist governments and revolutionary movements abroad.

Cuba has also intervened in the Horn of Africa. During the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977–1978, Havana threw its support behind Ethiopia after the Ethiopian government at the time, led by one of the most repressive communist rulers of the Cold War era, Mengistu Haile Mariam (Mengistu), embraced Marxism-Leninism and aligned itself with the Soviet Union. Cuba deployed approximately 15,000 to 17,000 troops, along with military assets such as armored units and air defense personnel, to fight on behalf of the Ethiopians, ultimately contributing to Ethiopia's victory in the conflict and the survival of a Soviet-backed Marxist regime (CIA, 1988; Valenta, 1980). This intervention serves as another example of Cuba’s willingness to send thousands of troops halfway around the world to export its own revolutionary ideology and support other communist regimes.

Cuba also played a role in the conflict that eventually led to the creation of modern Zimbabwe. During the Rhodesian Bush War, Cuba helped train and support guerrilla fighters aligned with Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU movement, a group that maintained close ties with the Soviet Union and other communist governments (Associated Press, 1978). Cuban personnel are said to have assisted with training programs in Zambia and Angola and worked alongside the Soviets to support the forces that were fighting to overthrow the Rhodesian government. By the late 1970s, growing Soviet and Cuban influence in southern Africa had become significant enough to draw widespread concern both from U.S. and international policymakers, who viewed the region as another front in the global Cold War struggle (Ottaway, 1979).

Cuba’s military interventions even reached the Middle East, proof that they were not just willing to support other anti-American and Soviet-aligned governments around the globe but also support governments hostile to Israel and U.S. interests and allies. During and after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Cuba sent military personnel to Syria to support Syrian forces against Israel. Reports from that time indicate that a Cuban armored brigade was stationed in Syria after the war to help operate Soviet-supplied T-62 tanks (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 1975). Cuban troops later clashed with Israeli forces on the Golan Heights during the 1974 war of attrition. It is said that Castro sent about 1,500 Cuban troops to the Golan Heights in support of Syria (Shindler, 2016).

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Havana also trained thousands of guerrillas from across Latin America, supplied weapons to insurgent organizations, and supported armed movements in countries including Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Argentina. One event that demonstrated Cuba's ambition to export revolution around the world more than any other occurred in January 1966, when Cuba hosted the Tricontinental Conference in Havana. This conference brought together more than 500 delegates from 82 countries, including communist governments, national liberation movements, revolutionary organizations, and anti-colonial groups from Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East (Kapcia, 2026). The event was used by Castro to position Cuba as the headquarters of the global revolutionary movement and created the Organization of Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America (OSPAAAL), which helped connect revolutionary movements across three continents through propaganda, political coordination, and support networks. The Tricontinental Conference was a turning point because it marked Cuba's transition from simply defending its own revolution to actively encouraging and supporting revolutions around the world and organizations committed to challenging American influence and overturning governments aligned with the West.

Cuba's support for revolutionary violence also reached the United States itself through Puerto Rican separatist groups. Beginning in the 1960s, Cuban intelligence recruited, trained, financed, and equipped militants who later formed or led groups such as the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) and “Los Macheteros.” Among them was Filiberto Ojeda Ríos, who spent several years in Cuba receiving intelligence and military training before returning to Puerto Rico, where he became a founder of the FALN and later the leader of Los Macheteros (U.S. Department of Justice, 2006). These organizations carried out bombings, assassinations, robberies, and other terrorist attacks in Puerto Rico and on the U.S. mainland throughout the 1970s and 1980s. One of the most infamous attacks was the 1975 bombing of Fraunces Tavern in New York City, which killed four people and injured more than 50. The Cuban regime also provided safe haven to William “Guillermo” Morales, one of the FALN's principal bomb makers and a U.S. fugitive, who remains one of several wanted Americans long protected by the Cubans (U.S. Department of State, 2025). Then in 1983, members of Los Macheteros carried out the $7.1 million Wells Fargo robbery in Connecticut, one of the largest cash robberies in American history. Victor Gerena, the Wells Fargo employee who carried out the inside portion of the robbery, escaped through Mexico and was widely believed by U.S. authorities to have fled to Cuba, where he remained beyond the reach of American authorities for decades (Fox, 2011). These serve as concrete examples of how Cuba's revolutionary agenda has not been confined to faraway Cold War battlefields. There is precedent for this evil agenda to reach American cities and directly threaten the lives of U.S. citizens on American soil.

Cuba has always been willing to provide support for a wide range of revolutionary and insurgent movements far beyond its own borders. Over the past six decades, Cuban intelligence services have trained fighters, supplied weapons, provided funding, and helped coordinate operations for leftist guerrilla groups seeking to overthrow governments aligned with the United States. Havana also built close security and intelligence partnerships with anti-American regimes and has constantly positioned itself as an advocate of anti-American causes in international forums, while promoting Soviet-backed causes. None of these interventions have been isolated episodes or coincidences. They are a deliberate foreign policy that seeks to undermine the United States and export revolution wherever opportunities emerge.

Exporting Revolution: Cuba's Political Influence Operations

Cuba’s efforts to export revolution are not just limited to armed movements or military interventions halfway across the world. For decades, the Castro regime also worked to spread its revolutionary ideas by influencing students, activists, intellectuals, and future political leaders. One example of this is that just months after taking power, Fidel Castro visited Harvard University in April 1959 at the invitation of McGeorge Bundy, Harvard's chief academic officer, who later became President John F. Kennedy's national security adviser. During his visit, Castro spoke to a huge football stadium full of university students and told them, “This is where you find the real military spirit, in students, not in the barracks” (Gonzalez & Gorka, 2024, p. 92). The visit showed that Cuba viewed American universities as an important audience from the very beginning of the revolution.

Castro put that strategy into practice almost immediately, and in 1960, only one year after taking power, he created the Cuban Institute of Friendship with the Peoples (ICAP). ICAP presents itself as a cultural and educational organization, but the Trump Administration has described it as the Cuban regime's principal vehicle for building relationships with foreign activists, universities, labor organizations, and political movements while supporting Cuban intelligence and counterintelligence activities. Through academic exchanges, organized travel, conferences, and “solidarity” programs, ICAP has worked tirelessly for decades to build a network that is sympathetic to the Cuban regime and helps it advance its interests. In June 2026, the State Department designated ICAP and its affiliated travel agency, Amistur Cuba S.A., for sanctions on precisely those grounds.

ICAP’s entire purpose has been to build a global movement sympathetic to the Cuban Revolution. According to the State Department's 2026 report, the organization spent decades building relationships with groups that embraced revolutionary violence or wanted to undermine American institutions, including the Black Panther Party and the Weather Underground. Cuba even provided some activists with travel, training, political support, refuge, and direct access to Cuban officials in return for helping spread the regime's revolutionary message when they returned home (U.S. Department of State, 2026).

The Venceremos Brigade offers a good example of how this worked in practice. Beginning in 1969, thousands of Americans traveled to Cuba under the banner of solidarity with Castro's revolution. They worked alongside Cubans, attended political programs, and experienced the country on the regime's terms before returning home. Some of those participants later found themselves in remarkably influential positions in American politics. Antonio Villaraigosa and Karen Bass, for example, both traveled to Cuba with the Brigade as young activists. Both would eventually become mayors of Los Angeles (Dovere, 2020). Castro was playing the long game: bring promising young Americans to Cuba, cultivate relationships with them, and send them home with a view of the revolution they might carry into American institutions for decades to come.

These networks changed with the times and later helped shape new organizations and activists involved in periods of domestic unrest in the U.S., including antifa activists as well as others who organized or participated in the demonstrations following George Floyd's death and the recent anti-ICE demonstrations (Suter, 2026). The network is still active. One current example is the National Network on Cuba, a coalition of more than 60 American organizations that works with ICAP and campaigns against U.S. policy toward Havana. In June 2026, the group circulated a rapid-response plan calling for demonstrations at federal buildings, military installations, recruiting offices, and ICE facilities within 24 hours of an actual or anticipated U.S. military action against Cuba. The demonstrations were to begin within 24 hours. According to the State Department, the goal was to make any U.S. action against the Cuban regime “politically and materially costly” here at home (U.S. Department of State, 2026).

Threats to U.S. Homeland Security

Cuba’s military is not what makes the regime dangerous. For decades, Havana has relied on espionage, intelligence operations, political influence, and cooperation with hostile foreign governments to advance its interests and undermine those of the United States. The Trump Administration recently highlighted these activities in a U.S. Department of State report, concluding that Cuba remains a persistent national security threat despite its economic decline (U.S. Department of State, 2026).

Cuba’s willingness to use military force has not been limited to activity abroad, and there have been some cases that have occurred much closer to home that have directly affected the United States. One of the most serious incidents happened on February 24, 1996, when Cuban Air Force MiG fighter jets shot down two unarmed civilian aircraft operated by Brothers to the Rescue, a Miami-based volunteer organization that regularly carried out flights attempting to find and assist Cubans who were trying to sail to the U.S. The attack killed four people, three of them U.S. citizens and one U.S. resident. This incident was no accident, because shortly after, the Cuban government accused the organization of engaging in covert operations against the regime (Humayun, 2026). This became one of the most significant confrontations in U.S.-Cuba relations after the Cold War and contributed to the passage of the Helms-Burton Act, which strengthened U.S. sanctions against the Cuban regime. Thirty years later, the shootdown remains a very painful and controversial chapter in the history of U.S.-Cuba relations (ABC News, 2026). In May 2026, only a few months after the 30th anniversary of the incident, U.S. authorities indicted Raúl Castro and other senior Cuban officials in connection with the 1996 attack (U.S. Department of Justice, 2026).

Shortly before the indictment against Castro was announced, tensions between Cuba and the United States had already begun to escalate. In February 2026, Cuban border guards intercepted a Florida-registered speedboat near Cuba’s northern coast. Cuban authorities alleged that the vessel was carrying armed Cuban exiles attempting to infiltrate the island (Mazzei et al., 2026). The confrontation resulted in an exchange of gunfire that killed five Cuban Americans and injured several more (CBS News, 2026).

Cuba’s intelligence services have also repeatedly shown they have the ability to penetrate some of the most sensitive parts of the U.S. government. Over the past couple of decades, Cuban intelligence has successfully recruited and directed spies who infiltrated the State Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, and other key national security institutions, stealing classified information, compromising U.S. intelligence operations, and undermining American interests. The most infamous cases include that of Ana Belén Montes, who spent seventeen years spying for Cuba from within her role as a top intelligence operative studying Cuba at the Defense Intelligence Agency, passing some of the nation’s most top-secret information to Havana, exposing covert U.S. officers, and compromising American intelligence operations before her arrest (Bailey, 2023). Other cases include Walter Kendall Myers and his wife Gwendolyn, who spent nearly thirty years providing classified information to Cuban intelligence before pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit espionage (Seattle Times news services, 2010); and former Ambassador Victor Manuel Rocha, who admitted to secretly serving as a Cuban agent for decades while holding senior positions at the State Department, the National Security Council, and even as a U.S. ambassador to Bolivia (Bazail-Eimil, 2023). Together, these cases leave little doubt that Cuba’s intelligence services remain a persistent and capable threat to U.S. national security (U.S. Department of State, 2026).

Another constant source of tension between Cuba and the United States is the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo Bay, a territory strategically important to U.S. national security because of its location and its role in supporting U.S. military and security operations in the Caribbean. The Cuban government has been demanding the return of the base for decades, saying that the United States has no right to remain there (CBS News, 2014).

Cuba was also the location of the first reported cases of what became known as Havana Syndrome. Beginning in 2016, American diplomats, intelligence officers, and other government and military personnel stationed in Cuba began reporting an unexplained array of neurological symptoms, including headaches, dizziness, hearing problems, balance issues, cognitive difficulties, and other health complications. The incidents led the U.S. to withdraw personnel from its embassy, reduce its diplomatic presence on the island, and launch multiple investigations. While the exact cause remains disputed, many experts argue that it is difficult to imagine such incidents occurring to foreign diplomats in one of the world's most heavily monitored police states without at least the knowledge of Cuban authorities.

The cause remains unresolved. However, a 2025 U.S. intelligence assessment revealed that two spy agencies believe a foreign actor could have developed or deployed a weapon that caused the mysterious health incidents (De Luce, 2025). One of the leading theories is that a directed-energy or microwave device may have been involved, a theory partly rooted in documented Soviet microwave operations against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow during the Cold War, which exposed American personnel to electromagnetic radiation for years. Although no hard evidence has been presented, and to this day, no one has been held responsible, despite the fact that as many as 1,500 American officials at home and abroad have suffered brain and other injuries in recent years from this Havana Syndrome that began in Cuba in 2016 continues to be cited as one of the most unsettling incidents in Cuba-U.S. relations (Regenstein, 2024).

Cuba has also repeatedly used migration as leverage in its relationship with the United States. The most notable example was the 1980 Mariel Boatlift, when Fidel Castro opened the port of Mariel and allowed a mass exodus to the United States. Over the course of several months, roughly 125,000 Cubans arrived in Florida, overwhelming local resources and creating a major political challenge for the Carter administration. Castro also used the migration crisis to expel criminals, psychiatric patients, and other people considered undesirable by the regime, effectively turning a humanitarian crisis into a political weapon against the United States (Carrillo, 2020). A similar crisis occurred during the 1994 Balsero crisis, when thousands of Cubans fled the island on makeshift rafts as the country's economy collapsed, forcing the United States to establish emergency migrant camps at Guantánamo Bay (University of Miami Libraries, n.d.). Similar migration waves have occurred during Cuba's current economic crisis, with more than one million people having left the island since mid-2021 (Rodríguez Granja, 2025). Because the island is only 90 miles from Florida, instability in Cuba can quickly become a U.S. national security concern. For decades, Cuban leaders have understood that large migration flows give Havana leverage over Washington in ways few other countries in the hemisphere can replicate or match.

Cuba’s Role in Drug Trafficking and Criminal Networks

The Cuban regime has been facing accusations of involvement in international drug trafficking for decades. In a 1985 assessment, the CIA concluded that Cuba was not simply turning a blind eye to the drug trade but actively helping traffickers. The report stated that senior Cuban officials facilitated drug-trafficking operations and that Fidel Castro was likely aware of and approved these activities. In some cases, Cuba allegedly provided traffickers with access to its waters, ports, and airspace, making it easier to move drugs toward the United States and harder for American authorities to stop them (CIA, 1985; U.S. House Committee on Government Reform, 1999).

The issue gained even more attention in 1989 when the Cuban government arrested and executed General Arnaldo Ochoa, one of the country’s most well-known military leaders, and several others on drug trafficking charges. The Cuban regime claimed this showed their commitment to fighting drug trafficking, but many remained suspicious about whether other senior officials within the regime knew about these activities and questioned whether Ochoa was used as a scapegoat.

More recent reporting has continued to raise concerns about organized crime and criminal networks operating in and around Cuba. A 2025 report described Cuba as a key facilitator in the development of criminal networks connected to Venezuela's Cartel of the Suns and argued that Havana has used relationships with traffickers, intelligence services, and allied regimes to expand its influence throughout the Western Hemisphere. Reports such as these reinforce longstanding concerns in Washington that the Cuban regime has at times viewed criminal networks not only as a source of revenue but also as a tool for advancing political and security objectives throughout Latin America (Center for a Free Cuba et al., 2025).

Previous U.S. Approaches Toward Cuba

During the Cold War, Washington treated Cuba as a communist ally of the Soviet Union and a direct threat to U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere. Although policies varied over time, successive administrations kept the U.S. economic embargo as the foundation of their approach while allowing some humanitarian trade, travel, and people-to-people contact. The most significant departure from this longstanding strategy happened during the Obama Administration.

In December 2014, President Barack Obama announced a policy of normalization with Cuba after more than five decades of strained relations. Over the next two years, the United States restored diplomatic relations, reopened embassies, eased restrictions on travel and remittances, expanded commercial ties, removed Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, and encouraged more interaction between Americans and the Cuban people (Obama White House, 2014). This came after approximately 18 months of secret negotiations between Washington and Havana, facilitated by Pope Francis and the Canadian government, and even included a prisoner exchange (Labott, 2014). The Obama Administration argued that decades of isolation had failed to achieve desired objectives and that opening Cuba to more tourism, commerce, and diplomacy would weaken the regime and create the conditions for political reform. That did not happen. The PCC remained in power, political prisoners remained behind bars, independent political opposition continued to face repression, and restrictions on freedom of expression and association persisted. To make matters worse, much of the increase in tourism and foreign investment flowed through military-controlled enterprises, particularly GAESA, allowing regime-linked institutions to benefit from increased foreign revenue.

President Donald Trump largely reversed the Obama Administration’s policy when he began his first term in 2017. His administration reinstated restrictions on individual travel (Lee, 2019), limited remittances (Lee & Weissenstein, 2019), restricted commercial flights to destinations outside Havana (Franck, 2019), and prohibited U.S. travelers from staying at hundreds of hotels and other businesses linked to the Cuban government, the Communist Party, and military-owned entities such as GAESA (Woodyard, 2020). In January 2021, during its final days in office, the Trump Administration redesignated Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, reversing the Obama Administration's 2015 decision (U.S. Embassy Havana, 2021). Rather than viewing economic engagement as a catalyst for reform, the Trump Administration pursued a strategy of increasing economic and diplomatic pressure on the Cuban government.

The Biden Administration did not fully return to the broad normalization pursued under the Obama Administration, but it moved in a similar direction in several areas. As a candidate, President Biden pledged to reverse Trump’s policies on Cuba. After taking office, however, his administration largely kept the existing sanctions framework while easing certain travel restrictions, eased restrictions on remittances, restored additional commercial flights, expanded visa processing, and increased support for Cuba's emerging private sector (Hansler & Liptak, 2022; Landay & Spetalnick, 2022). These changes did not produce meaningful political liberalization either. The Cuban government maintained one-party rule, continued to repress dissent, and further strengthened their relationship with U.S. adversaries, including Russia, China, and Iran. Meanwhile, Cuba's economic crisis got worse as shortages of food, fuel, and medicine became more severe and nationwide protests in July 2021 were met with mass arrests. The deteriorating conditions also contributed to the largest wave of emigration in Cuba's modern history, with more than one million Cubans—and by some estimates as many as two million—fleeing the island since 2021 (Rodríguez Granja, 2025). As with the Obama Administration, attempts to soften U.S. policy toward Cuba did not result in greater political freedom or a weakening of the Communist Party's control over the country.

Recent developments under President Trump’s second term reflect a fresh emphasis on national security in U.S. policy toward Cuba. On January 29, 2026, President Trump issued Executive Order 14380, declaring that "the policies, practices, and actions of the Government of Cuba constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat" to the national security and foreign policy of the United States (The White House, 2026). The order declared a national emergency under the National Emergencies Act and invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), citing Cuba's security and intelligence cooperation with countries such as Russia, China, and Iran, its support for organizations including Hamas and Hezbollah, and its role in undermining U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere. It also established a legal framework under which the United States could impose additional tariffs on imports from countries that directly or indirectly supply oil to Cuba, which paved the way for Trump’s current strategy of increasing economic pressure on the Cuban government and limiting external support for the regime (The White House, 2026). Unfortunately, these measures have not produced a change in the behavior of the Cuban leadership. However, the Trump Administration's actions have shown some effect, because they have made it more difficult for Havana to secure the external support on which it has long depended. Mexico, which had become Cuba’s principal external oil supplier, reduced shipments after the administration announced the new tariff authority, further tightening fuel supplies on the island (Planas, 2026).

Rather than pursuing political or economic reforms, the regime has continued to rely on internal repression, tighter state control, and deeper cooperation with countries such as Russia, China, and Iran. However, the Trump Administration's policies have increased economic pressure on the regime and made it more difficult for Havana to secure the external support on which it has long depended.

Together, these experiences suggest that future U.S. policy towards Cuba should be evaluated by whether it advances U.S. strategic interests. History also shows that pressure is most effective when it is tied to clear strategic objectives rather than used as an end in itself. The Trump Administration’s approach is significant because it frames Cuba not only as an isolated policy problem, but as part of a broader struggle over security and influence in the Western Hemisphere. From that perspective, U.S. pressure on Havana should be linked to specific goals: weakening the Communist Party’s control over the economy and political system, reducing revenue available to regime-linked institutions, preventing hostile powers from using Cuba as a platform near the United States, and creating better conditions for a democratic and free-market transition. The record of the past decade shows that a soft approach of opening and engaging with Cuba has not and will not produce meaningful liberalization. Instead, these approaches have only provided the regime with breathing room while leaving the core structures of repression intact.

Implications for U.S. National Security

The United States cannot afford to ignore Cuba. It is a hostile regime located 90 miles from Florida with a lengthy track record of working tirelessly against U.S. interests. For decades, Havana has supported anti-American governments, trained revolutionary movements, cooperated with and supported U.S. adversaries, and used its strategic location in the Caribbean to make itself useful to Russia, China, Venezuela, and other hostile powers. This matters because Cuba’s weakness, even now at its most fragile point in decades, does not make it harmless. In many ways, the possibility of collapse makes it more dangerous because it makes the regime more dependent on external support from extra-hemispheric influences such as Russia and China. Those governments are not helping Cuba out of charity or altruism. They know the island is a strategic foothold in America’s backyard. Russian military cooperation, Chinese intelligence activity, and all foreign support for the Cuban regime from our adversaries all create incredibly serious implications for the United States.

Mass illegal immigration is another area of concern. Time and time again, Cuba has demonstrated that instability on the island can quickly become a challenge for the United States. Border security has been a priority of the Trump Administration, making it especially important to pay attention to crises that could trigger large migration flows toward U.S. territory. That’s exactly what Cuba has a long history of doing. During the 1980 Mariel Boatlift, roughly 125,000 Cubans left for the United States in a matter of months (Carrillo, 2020). In 1994, during the Balsero crisis, thousands of Cubans again attempted to flee the island by sea, forcing the United States to respond to a major humanitarian and border crisis (University of Miami Libraries, n.d.). More recently, record numbers of Cubans have left the island during the current economic collapse (Rodríguez Granja, 2025). These migration waves are more than simply humanitarian tragedies. Migration is often weaponized or used as leverage against U.S. border security, immigration systems, and local communities, mostly in Florida but also all around the country.

The regime has also shown that it is willing to use force against Americans and against individuals connected to the United States. The 1996 Brothers to the Rescue shootdown (ABC News, 2026) and the recent 2026 speedboat incident (CBS News, 2026) are two examples of this, but they are not the only ones. In addition, Cuba’s role in drug trafficking and illicit networks that move drugs toward the United States adds another layer of concern. Whether through cooperation with cartels or drug traffickers, intelligence relationships, or the use of their territory, these activities undermine U.S. counternarcotics efforts, strengthen transnational criminal organizations, and threaten the safety and security of American communities and families.

The Trump Administration has already taken important steps to increase pressure on the Cuban regime. In 2026, President Trump signed an executive order expanding sanctions against GAESA, the military-controlled conglomerate that dominates much of Cuba's economy (U.S. Department of State, 2026). Secretary of State Marco Rubio has described GAESA as a tool used by the regime's political elite to enrich themselves while maintaining control over the population (Abi-Habib & Gamio, 2026). The administration has also expanded economic pressure on regime-linked entities (The White House, 2026), pursued criminal charges against former Cuban leader Raúl Castro and other officials (U.S. Department of Justice, 2026), increased scrutiny of Cuba's relationships with Russia, China, and Venezuela, and ramped up restrictions on energy flows to the island (Planas, 2026), President Trump declaring that there would be “no more oil or money going to Cuba—zero!” (Wright, 2026). It is important to highlight that the administration has emphasized that its pressure campaign is directed at the Cuban regime and not the Cuban people. In July 2026, the United States launched the first humanitarian flight to Cuba under Secretary of State Marco Rubio's $100 million assistance initiative. The shipment included food, medical supplies, and hygiene kits that were distributed through independent organizations instead of the Cuban government, in an effort to ensure that assistance reached the Cuban people without strengthening the regime (Reuters, 2026).

While providing humanitarian support, the administration has simultaneously elevated Cuba as a national security priority, combining the aid for the Cuban people with even more pressure on the regime. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz recently described Cuba as a national security threat and warned that China and Russia are using the island to collect intelligence near U.S. military bases (Mancini, 2026). CIA Director John Ratcliffe's rare visit to Havana in May 2026 also served as a warning, with Ratcliffe presenting U.S. demands that sent a clear message that the Trump Administration intended to increase pressure on the Cuban regime through tougher sanctions and criminal accountability against senior Cuban officials (Gazis, 2026).

The pressure campaign is expanding beyond sanctions. In August, Ratcliffe also created a new Cuba task force, another indication of just how seriously the administration now views the threat from Havana. The task force is designed to give the agency the ability to quickly put more money, personnel, and technology toward the island. The CIA is also adding more Cuba-focused spies and analysts, looking for divisions within Cuba's ruling elite, and following the money of senior regime officials both at home and abroad. But perhaps the clearest sign of the shift is how Washington now ranks the threat. The Trump Administration has reportedly made Cuba a “Priority 1” intelligence target, putting it in the same category as China, Russia, and Iran. Other U.S. intelligence agencies are now devoting more attention to the island as well, including using satellites to get a clearer picture of what is happening on the island (Entous, 2026). After decades of Cuba slipping down Washington's list of concerns, it is back near the top.

This pressure has clearly worried the regime. In response, Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel resorted to war rhetoric, warning that any U.S. military action “will cause a bloodbath with incalculable consequences” (Zegarra & Oppmann, 2026). However, as Cuba continues to deepen its ties with America's adversaries and continues to create further migration, security, and intelligence concerns, pressure on the regime is increasingly viewed by U.S. policymakers as an indispensable component of a national security strategy focused on protecting American interests in the Western Hemisphere.

Policy Recommendations

Cuba should be treated as a central front in America’s struggle to reassert control over the Western Hemisphere. A communist dictatorship aligned with Russia, China, Venezuela, and Iran is a national security concern, and they should not be allowed to operate free of consequences only 90 miles from our homeland. As part of a broader Western Hemisphere strategy, the Trump Administration should pursue a policy of maximum pressure on the regime. The following recommendations implement the broader America First strategy for the Western Hemisphere by denying hostile powers a foothold near the American homeland, restoring American strategic primacy in the Caribbean, strengthening regional security cooperation, and supporting a transition toward a free and prosperous Cuba.

1. The United States Should REESTABLISH A PERMANENT U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN. The U.S. National Security Strategy under President Trump has identified the Western Hemisphere as a vital strategic interest (The White House, 2025). The Department of War should administratively assign dedicated naval, Coast Guard, intelligence, air, cyber, and special operations forces to U.S. Southern Command on a permanent basis rather than relying on temporary deployments from other combatant commands. After all, today’s U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) was first known as Caribbean Command because back then, before attention shifted elsewhere, the Caribbean was considered our third border. Today’s challenges prove the United States needs a permanent U.S. military presence in the Caribbean capable of monitoring activity originating from or transiting through Cuba, tracking Chinese and Russian activity, disrupting narcotics trafficking, protecting the maritime and aerospace approaches to the homeland, responding rapidly to regional crises, and deterring hostile powers from expanding their military and intelligence footprint near the United States. Congress should then reinforce this policy by authorizing the resources necessary and codifying minimum force requirements for SOUTHCOM to ensure they are maintained across future administrations. This would ensure the command always has the resources necessary to defend U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere and respond quickly to threats in our near-abroad. This does not mean the U.S. needs to build large permanent bases in Cuba or elsewhere in the Caribbean. Rather, the U.S. could simply expand access agreements, overflight rights, and cooperative security locations with trusted partners as like-minded governments who seek closer security ties with the United States continue to emerge across the region. That will give American forces the ability to move quickly and efficiently without having to maintain a large footprint in every single country. If the Western Hemisphere is as important to U.S. security as Washington now says it is, SOUTHCOM should not be forced to operate with temporary or leftover resources and assets. America’s neighborhood deserves a permanent security presence.
2. EXPAND TERRORISM DESIGNATIONS AGAINST THE CUBAN REGIME. The Trump Administration has already designated Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (Congressional Research Service, 2025). It should now direct the State Department, Treasury Department, Department of Justice, and Intelligence Community to review whether the PCC, GAESA, or other regime-controlled organizations meet the four criteria for designation as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) under U.S. law. That review should examine evidence of their involvement in, support for, or facilitation of terrorist activity, political violence, repression, attacks on innocent civilians, and assistance to hostile actors, and determine whether the applicable legal thresholds are satisfied. The PCC should not be treated like just another authoritarian government. It is a hostile regime that has supported violent actors, protected U.S. fugitives, worked with America’s adversaries, and helped sustain anti-American networks across the hemisphere. The administration can draw lessons from the aggressive, whole-of-government frameworks used against Mexican cartels, IRGC, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and other hostile networks. The value gives the ability to combine terrorism authorities with financial sanctions, criminal prosecutions, material-support laws, visa restrictions, asset blocking, intelligence tools, and every other lawful authority available to isolate the regime and dismantle the networks that keep it in power.
3. Expose and Remove America's Adversaries from Cuba. The administration should make the termination of Cuba’s military, intelligence, cyber, and surveillance cooperation with China, Russia, Iran, and every other hostile power operating on the island a nonnegotiable condition for improved relations with the United States. Chinese intelligence collection facilities should be shut down, Russian military cooperation should end, and every foreign intelligence operation directed at the United States should be immediately dismantled and removed. The administration should establish clear and verifiable benchmarks for these actions and impose escalating consequences when Havana fails to meet them. The Departments of State, War, Treasury, Commerce, and the Intelligence Community should coordinate a sustained campaign to identify, publicly expose, and disrupt Chinese, Russian, Iranian, and other hostile military, intelligence, cyber and dual-use activities operating from Cuba. Building on congressionally mandated reporting on Russian and Chinese activities in Cuba (Gertz, 2026), the administration should provide regular public, unclassified assessments of the threat posed by hostile foreign activity on the island. Where possible, these assessments should document foreign military, intelligence, infrastructure, and economic activities on the island so that allies, partners, and the American people understand the full scope of the threat. Until these activities have been verifiably terminated, the United States should continue imposing diplomatic, economic, and intelligence costs on both the Cuban regime and the foreign governments responsible for them. No hostile military or intelligence presence should be tolerated near the American homeland.
4. Stop Cuba from Cooperating with America’s Adversaries. The administration should demand that Cuba end all their foreign security operations around the globe. They should immediately withdraw its military, intelligence, and security personnel from Venezuela, Nicaragua, and every other country where they are helping authoritarian governments stay in power. Havana has spent decades exporting repression and instability throughout the hemisphere. The United States should make clear that until every Cuban security deployment abroad has ended, not only will there be zero sanctions relief, expanded diplomatic engagement, or normalization efforts, but all military options will remain on the table. Full closure of all Chinese SIGINT facilities, along with the termination of associated intelligence cooperation, must be a precondition for any normalization. If Cuba refuses, the United States should continue strengthening targeted sanctions, expanding intelligence collection, exposing Cuban and foreign malign activities publicly, and disrupting the financial and security networks that sustain them. The administration should also work to continue to cut off the foreign financial, intelligence, and security networks that allow Cuba to support authoritarian governments throughout the hemisphere.
5. STRENGTHEN U.S. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AGAINST CUBA. The administration should direct the FBI, Department of Homeland Security, and the intelligence community to make Cuban intelligence activities inside the United States a higher counterintelligence priority. For decades, the Cuban regime has used espionage and influence operations to collect information, recruit sources, penetrate American institutions, and advance its interests at the expense of the United States. As the Trump Administration recently concluded, these activities remain an active national security concern (U.S. Department of State, 2026). The administration should assess whether existing counterintelligence capabilities adequately reflect the scope and sophistication of the Cuban threat and address any gaps that may be identified. This should include expanding intelligence sharing across federal agencies, improving coordination of investigations involving Cuban intelligence, devoting additional counterintelligence resources to monitoring Cuban intelligence activities, closely scrutinize Cuban government-sponsored exchange and influence programs, and aggressively investigate and disrupt Cuban intelligence operations targeting the United States.
6. Break the Communist Party's Grip on Cuba. The Trump Administration should make it clear that there will be no real normalization with Cuba until the regime gives up its control over the country’s economy. That starts with GAESA being dismantled. Its hotels, banks, ports, retail chains, and other state-owned businesses should be removed from military control and sold through a public auction or a similar open and transparent privatization process, with safeguards to prevent former regime officials and other politically connected insiders from acquiring disproportionate control, managed by the U.S. The goal should be to build a real free-market economy where the Cuban people can own businesses that generate wealth. Cubans, Cuban exiles, and American companies should all be allowed to invest in rebuilding the island, but hostile governments like China, Russia, and Iran should be prohibited from buying strategic assets. The same applies to the PCC. Strategic sectors such as ports, telecommunications, energy infrastructure, airports, and critical logistics networks should never be allowed to fall under the control of hostile foreign governments or their state-owned enterprises. As long as they control the economy, the courts, the military, the media, and every major institution in the country, Cuba will never be free. Any path toward normalized relations with the United States should require destroying both GAESA and the Communist Party and replacing them with democratic institutions, free elections, and a competitive market economy.
7. INCREASE ECONOMIC PRESSURE. The Trump Administration has shown that it is willing to choke out the Cuban economy. That pressure should only increase in order to deprive the regime and the institutions that sustain it of resources while increasing leverage for political reform—not to rely on economic hardship alone to force the PCC from power. Sanctions against GAESA, senior Communist Party officials, and every regime-controlled business that keeps the dictatorship alive should be expanded, and the United States should take that a step further and impose tough secondary sanctions on foreign banks, companies, and governments that continue doing business with the regime or keeping the regime afloat, whether they are in China, Russia, Venezuela, Canada, Mexico, or elsewhere. The Departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce should also publish regular reports identifying the foreign banks, companies, and governments that continue financing or facilitating business with the Cuban regime. Publicly exposing these networks will increase the economic and reputational cost of supporting Havana. No country should be allowed to help prop up this communist dictatorship that seeks to harm the U.S. It’s a simple message: there will be no meaningful sanctions relief until Cuba holds free and fair elections, releases all political prisoners, legalizes opposition parties, protects a free press, and begins transitioning to a free-market economy. Cuba will never be welcomed back into the democratic and economic community of the Americas if the PCC remains in power.
8. DEMAND FREE ELECTIONS AND GENUINE DEMOCRATIC REFORM. The administration should make it clear that there will be no normalization of relations with them until Cuba holds fair, free, and internationally monitored elections. The administration should publicly state this policy and consistently communicate it, making clear that sanctions of relief and broader normalization will not occur until these conditions are met. In order for that to happen, they will need to legalize opposition parties, release all political prisoners, restore an independent judiciary, and take steps towards protecting freedom of speech, religion, and the press. Every step toward improved relations should be tied to measurable and visible democratic reforms. Any attempt by the regime to offer superficial reforms while keeping the PCC in power is a non-starter. These reforms include constitutional reform, because long-term normalization can’t happen while Cuba’s current communist constitution remains in place. Any future constitution should be written by the Cuban people through a free and democratic process and approved in a national referendum. At a minimum, it should guarantee free elections, separation of powers, an independent judiciary, strong protections for private property, free enterprise, freedom of speech and religion, and constitutional safeguards that prevent the return of the PCC. If the regime refuses, the administration should double down on expanding sanctions and diplomatic pressure until real change takes place.
9. Require Accountability for Past Abuses. As part of any normalization process, the Cuban government should be required to take concrete, verifiable steps to address decades of political repression and human rights abuses. As a bare minimum, Havana should be required to return all U.S. fugitives and fully cooperate with outstanding extradition requests, immediately release every political prisoner, close prisons and detention facilities used to imprison political dissidents or critics of the regime, and open the archives of the Communist Party, the Ministry of the Interior, and Cuba's intelligence services so victims and their families can learn the truth about decades of repression. The Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) and other neighborhood surveillance organizations used to monitor and intimidate ordinary Cubans should also be dismantled as part of any democratic transition. Cuban exiles and their descendants should also be guaranteed the right to recover their citizenship, obtain Cuban passports, and access government records and property documents that belong to them or their families.
10. HELP BREAK THE CUBAN REGIME'S INFORMATION MONOPOLY AND MODERNIZE AMERICA'S INFORMATION OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE REGIME. The Communist Party has stayed in power for decades in large part because it has controlled what Cubans can read, watch, hear, and say. This must end once and for all. The United States has long used tools such as Radio Martí and TV Martí to challenge that monopoly and provide the Cuban people with uncensored news and information that the regime refuses to allow (Congressional Research Service, 1994). The Trump Administration was right to target waste and inefficiency in these programs, but their underlying mission remains important. Rather than simply restoring the old model, the administration should preserve the aspects of these programs that were effective while replacing outdated ones with a leaner, digital-first information initiative designed specifically to reach the Cuban people through social media, podcasts, mobile platforms, anti-censorship technology, and other tools that are harder for the regime to block. The administration could also expand support for secure communications, anti-censorship technology, digital freedom initiatives, and independent civil society organizations that expose regime corruption and counter Communist Party propaganda. The Trump Administration has worked hard to reduce spending on ineffective foreign assistance programs and could redirect some of those savings toward strategic communications that directly advance U.S. national security interests. Creating access to truthful information will be far less expensive than dealing with the consequences of a stronger communist regime backed by China, Russia, Iran, and Venezuela. Money spent weakening one of America's oldest adversaries just 90 miles from our shores is money well spent.
11. Require Cuba to Join the Hemisphere's U.S.-Led Security Framework. If Cuba wants normalized relations with the United States, and much of the rest of the hemisphere, it first needs to prove that it is willing to contribute to regional security instead of undermining it. As an initial step, the administration should require Cuba to end all support for narcotics trafficking, hostile intelligence cooperation, and regional subversion. A transitional or democratic Cuban government should then resume counternarcotics and law enforcement cooperation with the United States and democratic partners throughout the hemisphere. As that cooperation develops and Cuba demonstrates its reliability as a regional security partner, formal participation in initiatives such as America’s Counter Cartel Coalition (ACCC) (U.S. Department of War, 2026) should become a condition for deeper normalization. For 67 years, Cuba has supported and abetted many of the same criminal and authoritarian actors that threaten security across the entire hemisphere. Cuba should not only be expected to stop being a part of the problem, but they should also be expected to contribute to finding a solution in order to qualify for the benefits of normalized relations.
12. KEEP EVERY LAWFUL INSTRUMENT OF AMERICAN POWER ON THE TABLE. Finally, the administration should continue using every lawful tool available to defend American interests in the Western Hemisphere, including diplomacy, military power, intelligence, financial tools, law enforcement, cyber capabilities, strategic communications, export controls, and sanctions to defend U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere. Cuba should never believe it can cooperate with America's adversaries without consequences. While military force should always remain a last resort, the administration should not rule out any lawful option necessary to protect the homeland, remove hostile foreign military or intelligence capabilities from Cuba, or defend American citizens and interests. America must make it clear that nothing is off limits.

Conclusion

Cuba is entering one of the most uncertain periods in its modern history. The regime is under pressure from every direction. Its economy is failing, its population is shrinking, its allies are weaker than they once were, and millions of Cubans have lost faith that things will improve. Yet a weaker Cuba does not automatically mean a safer Western Hemisphere. History shows that authoritarian regimes under pressure often become more unpredictable, more repressive, and more dependent on foreign support, often from hostile foreign powers abroad.

For the United States, Cuba is not just one more foreign policy issue. It is a communist dictatorship less than 100 miles from our shores that continues to work with America's adversaries, fuel instability in the region, and create challenges that eventually reach our own borders. Ignoring those realities will not make them disappear.

The Trump Administration has already begun changing course by restoring pressure on the regime and treating the Western Hemisphere as a core national security priority. That approach should continue in order to deny the regime the money, partnerships, and freedom of action it has relied on for decades while making clear that there is a path to a different future if Cuba chooses it.

The objective is simple: force America's adversaries out of Cuba, break the Communist Party's monopoly on power, restore free elections and free markets, and ensure that the island can never again be used as a platform to threaten the United States. A free, stable, and democratic Cuba would benefit not only the Cuban people, but the security and prosperity of the entire Western Hemisphere.